Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NEA-13

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SAM-01 SS-20

RSC-01 L-03 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 DODE-00 MC-02

ACDA-19 OMB-01 AID-20 IGA-02 TRSE-00 EB-11 DRC-01

NEAE-00 /150 W

----- 001822

P R 301142Z JAN 74
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3145
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

SECRETISLAMABAD 1096

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CINCPAC

- 1. MY TALK WITH AZIZ AHMED THIS MORNING WAS RATHER BRIEF AS WE HAD PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR MILITARY SUPPLY PROBLEM. ALSO HE WAS JUST BACK FROM HIS MIDDLE EAST TRIP AND IN THE PROCESS OF PREPARING TO GO TO KABUL.
- 2. AZIZ AHMED STUDIED CAREFULLY MY LETTER TO BHUTTO RE UPGRADING TANKS CONTAINED IN ISLAMABAD 1022, AND MORE HURRIEDLY READ MY AIDE MEMOIRE ON RADAR EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN ISLAMABAD 1023.
- 3. HE SAID THERE WERE SOME ASPECTS OF MY LETTER TO BHUTTO THAT PLEASED HIM AND THAT IT PROBABLY REPRESENTED A SMALL STEP FORWARD. HIS MAIN CONCER, HOWEVER, WAS OUR INABILITY TO HELP THEM EITHR THROUGH GRANTS OR LONG TERM CREDITS. I EXPLAINED THAT WE JUST DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO GO ANY FURTHER THAN AS INDICATED IN MY SECRET

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LETTER. HE SAID HE DID NOT SEE HOW PAKISTAN COULD AFFORD

THIS EXPENDITURE UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS, AND THE PAK MILITARY WERE GETTING EXTREMELY DEPRESSED OVER THE STATE OF THEIR MILITARY HARDWARE AS COMPARED TO THAT OF INDIA. HE SAID HE HAD REALLY HOPED THAT WE WOULD TAKE STEPS ON OUR OWN TO EASE OUR EMBARGO AFTER THE BHUTTO VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND THE PAK MILITARY HAD BEEN EXPECTANT. NOW, HOWEVER, THEY SAW SOME SIGNS THAT IT WAS IN FACT HARDENING. HE GAVE ME A PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT HAVING TO DO WITH OUR DISAPPROVAL IN WASHINGTON OF CERTAIN AIR FORCE ITEMS (TO BE SENT SEPARATELY.)

4. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW FOR WHAT PURPOSE I HAD ASKED TO SEE HIM, AND THAT HE HAD INTENDED TO GIVE ME A SHORT MEMO ON THE SUBJECT OF TANK UPGRADING. HE RATHER SADLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS NO POINT IN GIVING IT TO ME BECAUSE MY LETTER ALREADY GAVE HIM THE ANSWERS. I ASKED FOR A COPY ANYWAY. IT WAS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT: AT PRESENT WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING OLD VINTAGE TANKS - MAP ORIGIN, WHICH ARE WORN OUT AND NEED IMMEDIATE REPLACEMENT OR RETROFITTING:

(A) M 47 (PATTON) 142)) 263

(B) M 48 (PATTON) 121)

US AUTHORITIES HAVE ESTABLISHED A RETROFIT PLANT IN IRAN FOR DIESELIZATION OF PATTON TANKS AND THE IRANIANS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY DIESELIZED A LARGE NUMBER OF THEIR PATTONS. THE RATE OF DIESELIZATION IS ONE TANK DAILY; AND ALL THE IRANIAN FLEET OF M 47/48 TANKS WILL BE DIESELIZED BY END OF 1973 WHEN THE FACTORY WILL BE HANDED OVER TO IRANIAN AUTHORITIES. THE COAS WAS INFORMED DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO IRAN THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO RETROFIT OUR PATTON TANKS IN THIS FACTORY SUBJECT TO US GOVT APPROVAL AND COMPLETE THE DIESELEIZATION OF ALL OUR PATTON FLEET BY THE END OF 1974. THE COST OF RETROFIT/ DIESELIZATION WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY \$110,000, INCLUDING TRANSPORTATION CHARGES WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY 1,000 US DOLLARS TO IAN AND BACK. THE TOTAL EXPENDITURE WILL BE APPROXIMATELY THE EQUIVALENT OF 30 MILLION US DOLLARS. OUR PRESENT FINANCIAL RESOURCES DO NOT PERMIT US TO SECRET

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MAKE AN OUT-RIGHT PURCHASE OF NEW TANKS TO REPLACE THE OLD VINTAGE PATTONS NOR ARE WE IN A POSITION TO BEAR THE COST OF DIESELIZATION/RETROFITTING IN IRAN INVOLVING AN EXPENDITURE OF APPROXIMATELY 30 MILLION US DOLLARS. THE US AUTHORITIES MAY THEREFORE BE REQUESTED TO HELP IN GETTING OUR PATTON TANKS DIESELIZED IN IRAN. THE BILL FOR RETROFITTING WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE MET BY THE US GOVERNMENT. END TEXT.

- 5. THE MAIN POINT AZIZ AHMED MADE ABOUT MY AIDE MEMOIRE ON RADAR EQUIPMENT WAS THE DISPARITY OF TREATMENT OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN THIS FIELD, AS INDIA WAS GETTING FMS CREDIT. I POINTED OUT OF COURSE THAT THAT WAS AN ARRANGEMENT MADE IN 1968 WHEN WE DID HAVE SUCH CREDIT CAPABILITY. I ALSO EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT THIS WAS PART OF A CLEAN-UP PACKAGE WHICH ALSO INCLUDED PROVISION OF APC'S FOR PAKISTAN.
- 6. I POINTED OUT THAT OUR REPLIES WERE FAR FROM BEING TOTALLY NEGATIVE, AS FROM A POLICY POINT OF VIEW WE WERE SAYING THAT THEY COULD GO RIGHT AHEAD AND WE WOULD TRY TO BE HELPFUL IN THE PROCESS. THE INDIANS WOULD, OF COURSE, PROBABLY SCREAM OVER THE TANK DEAL AS THEY WERE IN THE HABIT OF COMPLAINING FROM TIME TO TIME THAT PAKISTAN TANKS WERE IN FACT BEING UPGRADED IN IRAN. WE HAD TAKEN THAT ALL INTO CONSIDERATION AND HAD SAID, "GO AHEAD." AZIZ AHMED AGREED THAT OUR REPLY WAS NOT TOTALLY NEGATIVE AND THAT IF THEY HAD FUNDS OF THEIR OWN IT WOULD BE VERY GOOD INDEED.
- 7. I HAVE A FEELING THAT THEY WILL PROBABLY JUST FORGET THE RADAR EQUIPMENT PROJECT. I DO NOT KNOW, OF COURSE, WHAT BHUTTO MAY DECIDE TO DO ON THE TANK QUESTION. THERE IS A CHANCE HE MAY FEEL THAT HE HAS TO MAKE THIS OUTLAY OF FUNDS, IF NO CREDIT CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE, BECAUSE OF THE FEELING IN HIS OWN MILITARY.
- 8. AZIZ AHMED GAVE ME A LENGTHY PAPER ON WHAT PAK INTELLIGENCE BELIEVES SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA AMOUNTS TO SINCE 1965. HE ALSO GAVE ME ANOTHER LENGTHY PAPER OF REQUIREMENTS OF THE PAK MILITARY WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN SECRET

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MADE UP FOR BHUTTO TO LEAVE BEHIND IN THE WHITE HOUSE ON HIS RECENT VISIT. HE SAID THAT BHUTTO AT THE VERY LAST MINUTE DECIDED NOT TO PRESENT THE PAPER. WE HAVE NOT YET HAD TIME TO ANALYZE EITHER OF THESE DOCUMENTS.
BYROADE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

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